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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a received narrative about women’s rights, and espe-
cially the quest for women’s formal legal equality in the United
States (U.S.), that focuses primarily on the emergence of economic
and political rights for women, especially wives. It begins with re-
sistance to coverture and carries us through the Married Women’s
Property Acts, suffrage, the Nineteenth Amendment, and beyond.
* Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of Law (2004–2020). Both the title
and the idea for this Article are drawn from Stephanie Jones-Rogers’ book, They Were Her
Property. See STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEYWERE HER PROPERTY: WHITEWOMEN AS
SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2019). An earlier version of this Article was pre-
sented at the Women in Legal Education Section event at the 2020 Association of American
Law Schools annual meeting, and I would like to thank Prof. Rona Kaufman, organizer, and
Professors Nan Hunter, Leslie Jacobs, and Danaya Wright, sister panelists, for their presen-
tations, and all the attendees at that event for their feedback.
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There is also a now-familiar critique of that narrative, one that
points out that the situation and experiences of American women of
color, especially enslaved and formerly enslaved women of African
descent, are frequently omitted from what is ostensibly feminist or
“women’s” history. Often, these women’s experience is completely
ignored; when included, it is frequently marginalized, just as
(white) women’s experience was formerly left out of history itself.1
The critique rightly reveals exclusion, and thus demands inclu-
sion. Where generalizations about (unmodified) “women” do not ap-
ply to or include women of color, where (especially) celebratory and
progressivist narratives about the improvement of “women’s” legal
condition in America are not borne out by the lived experiences of
non-white/BIPOC2 women, history must be revised. This essential
critique challenges us to think about how priorities have been and
should be set in feminist movements and in historical accounts of
those movements.
But this critique does not always go far enough. Nineteenth cen-
tury legal feminism, nominally aimed at the expansion of women’s
rights in the U.S., not only reflected but also actively furthered rac-
ism and white supremacy. Nineteenth century legal arrangements,
including coverture, may have disfavored free white women vis-à-
vis their white husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons—but the dis-
mantling of coverture in the antebellum period only put more dis-
tance between Black and white women. The Married Women’s
Property Acts and the early women’s suffrage laws, twin pillars of
what is sometimes called “first wave” feminism, did not simply ig-
nore or overlook the concerns of non-white women (generally with-
out making that explicit). In the name of all women, these move-
ments largely advanced the rights of free white women at the ex-
pense of Black women. But that is not how the story is typically
told.
Consider how the most recent edition of the most widely used
Property law textbook in the U.S. begins its description of the Mar-
ried Women’s Property Acts: “Beginning with Mississippi in 1839,
1. There is a similar important critique made from the LGBTQ perspective, related to
the exclusion of non-heterosexual women, which is beyond the scope of this Article. See Nan
D. Hunter, In Search of Equality for Women: From Suffrage to Civil Rights, 59 DUQ. L. REV.
125 (2021).
2. This acronym stands for Black, Indigenous, and People of Color, and has been in use
since about 2013. It is intended to reflect the various experiences and identities of non-white
people. Because this Article includes discussion of both Black and Indigenous people, it is
appropriate to employ it. See Sandra E. Garcia, Where Did BIPOC Come From?, N.Y TIMES
(June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-bipoc.html.
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all common law property states had, by the end of the nineteenth
century, enacted Married Women’s Property Acts.”3
Wait, what? Mississippi? In 1839? Though the authors glide
right past it, the attentive reader is certain to ask herself how that
happened. Antebellum Mississippi is hardly known as a bastion of
progressive legal reform. But Mississippi was the first state to do
this? Not Massachusetts, the home of Yankee individualism? Or
the frontier territory of Wyoming, the first state where women had
the right to vote?4 No, it was Mississippi.
The casebook (which has five male authors, none of them BIPOC)
continues:
[t]hese statutes removed the disabilities of coverture and gave
a married woman, like a single woman, control over all her
property. Such property was her separate property, immune
from her husband’s debts. The wife also gained control of all
her earnings outside the home.
The Married Women’s Property Acts, prompted by a desire to
protect a wife’s property from her husband’s creditors, as well
as to grant her legal autonomy, did not give the wife full equal-
ity. Husband and wife were expected to play complementary
roles. The husband, employed outside the home, remained
head of the family and owed his wife a duty of support; his wife,
mistress of the household and in charge of rearing the children,
owed him domestic services. Although the wife was given con-
trol over her property, it was unlikely that—as an unpaid
homemaker—she would have much of that commodity.5
3. JESSEDUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 385 (8th ed. 2014). The second Concise Edition
of the same casebook omits to mention Mississippi, but says this:
In the 1800s, most common law property states enacted Married Women’s Property
Acts. These statutes gave a married woman, like a single woman, control over all her
property . . . . The wife also gained control of all her earnings outside the home.
The Married Women’s Property Acts did not give the wife full equality. The husband
remained head of the family; the wife, although given control over her property, was
unlikely, as an unpaid homemaker, to have much property.
JESSEDUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY: CONCISE EDITION 268 (2d ed. 2017).
4. Wyoming Legislators Write the First State Constitution to Grant Women
the Vote, HIST., https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/wyoming-legislators-write-the-
first-state-constitution-to-grant-women-the-vote#:~:text=On%20September%2030%2C%201
889%2C%20the,its%20female%20citizens%20to%20vote (Sept. 28, 2020).
5. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY, supra note 3, at 385. The second Concise Edition of
the same casebook says this:
[i]n the 1800s, most common law property states enacted Married Women’s Property
Acts. These statutes gave a married woman, like a single woman, control over all her
property . . . . The wife also gained control of all her earnings outside the home.
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What that deracinated discussion completely neglects to mention
is that the “property” Mississippi wives first won the right to control
was property in enslaved human beings—especially fertile women
of African descent. The value of enslaved labor and the offspring of
enslaved people frequently made them the most attractive assets in
the marital estate of an otherwise impecunious debtor—and the
most fiercely defended by his propertied slave-owning wife. The
nineteenth century scenario was more “Gone with the Wind”6 than
“The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet.”7 The women who lived and
died in slavery would never be wives, because they were legally pro-
hibited from marrying.8 Nor did they have control over their prop-
erty or earnings, despite their single status—not because they were
1950s-style “unpaid homemakers” (though they were surely that,
as well), but because they were lifelong hereditary slaves.
Whether coverture was respected, avoided, or dismantled, en-
slaved Black women were exploited. Under coverture, the protec-
tion of free white married women’s property in human beings was
occasionally accomplished through creative trust arrangements.
The first American Married Women’s Property Act was born from a
desire to simplify that situation and improve it—but only for the
free white married women it protected, not for the enslaved Black
women under their ownership and control. Like so much of Ameri-
can law, the origin story of the Married Women’s Property Acts
comes complete with a racist original sin.
II. SLAVEOCRACY, COVERTURE, ANDGIFTS AND TRUSTS OF
ENSLAVED PEOPLE
Antebellum property dispositions and estate plans in the Ameri-
can South reflected a political economy and regime of ownership
that was both gendered and raced. Those aspects of marital prop-
erty law encompassed by the doctrine called “coverture” radically
The Married Women’s Property Acts did not give the wife full equality. The husband
remained head of the family; the wife, although given control over her property, was
unlikely, as an unpaid homemaker, to have much property.
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY: CONCISE EDITION, supra note 3, at 268.
6. The 1939 film Gone with The Wind, based on Margaret Mitchell’s book of the same
name, is the (inflation-adjusted) highest-grossing film of all time. It is set in Civil War-era
Georgia. Jennifer Schuessler, The Long Battle Over ‘Gone with The Wind’, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/movies/gone-with-the-wind-battle.html (June 15,
2020).
7. The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_
Adventures_of_Ozzie_and_Harriet (Oct. 22, 2020, 1:51 PM).
8. Darlene C. Goring, The History of Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 335 36 nn.192 95 (2006).
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disempowered women upon and during marriage. Astute planners
employed traditional Anglo-American common-law devices, espe-
cially trusts known as “marriage settlements,” to protect marriage-
eligible women in this unique legal context, where other women and
men, especially fertile enslaved Black women, were a crucial com-
ponent of the wealth of the wealthiest families. As historian Jen-
nifer Morgan expresses it, “slaveowners supplemented the present
value of enslaved persons with the speculative value of a woman’s
reproductive potential . . . .”9 Early on, gifts of enslaved people to
free women (daughters, wives, widows, and wives-to-be) were struc-
tured to avoid some of the undesirable consequences of coverture.
Later came a more straightforward assertion of the free married
woman’s property rights—including rights in other human beings.
A. A Note on Terminology: “Plantocracy” or “Slaveocracy”?
There is no single, widely accepted term for the racialized politi-
cal and economic arrangement that prevailed in the antebellum
Southern states of the U.S., whose distinctive feature was the large
plantation with an enslaved labor force. Although the plantation is
paradigmatic of the “old South,” it was hardly typical: nearly three-
quarters of Southern white people had no property in enslaved peo-
ple at all, and only about twelve percent of slaveholders enslaved
more than twenty individuals.10 Wealth was extremely concen-
trated: more than ninety percent of all agricultural wealth was
owned by slaveholders.11 Two terms in use since the mid-nine-
teenth century to describe this are “plantocracy” and “slaveocracy.”
“Plantocracy” was first used in print in 1846 and occasionally
thereafter, to mean “[a] dominant class or caste consisting of plant-
ers.”12 It has been used by many leading American historians,13 in-
cluding C. Vann Woodward in the mid-twentieth century,14 and has
the benefit of sharing the etymological structure of “democracy,”
9. JENNIFER L. MORGAN, LABORING WOMEN: REPRODUCTION AND GENDER IN NEW
WORLD SLAVERY 91 (Daniel K. Richter & Kathleen M. Brown eds., 2004).
10. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51
STAN. L. REV. 221, 224 n.6 (1999) (citing ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE
PLANTATIONHOUSEHOLD: BLACKANDWHITEWOMENOF THEOLDSOUTH 86 (1988); KENNETH
M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 27 (1956)).
11. PETERKOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619 1877, at 180 (1993).
12. 11 Plantocracy, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); see also Plantoc-
racy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plantocracy (last
visited Oct. 29, 2020).
13. See Davis, supra note 10, at 224 n.6.
14. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1374 (1988) (citing C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1958)).
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“aristocracy,” and similar terms, in identifying the ruling class in
the word itself. As Adrienne Davis explained in her 1999 article,
The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, the
term “describe[s] the southern political economy in which the mode
of production, slavery, structured social and economic relation-
ships.”15 It also builds in the idea that a plantation economy, in
which the profitable cultivation of crops effectively requires a bound
labor force, encourages distinctive political arrangements.16 How-
ever, the term itself omits any mention of slavery, and has generally
been used more often to describe the West Indies than the U.S.17
“Slaveocracy” (with the occasional variant spelling “slavocracy”),
defined as “[t]he domination of slave-holders; slave-holders collec-
tively as a dominant or powerful class,”18 not only mentions slavery
but was used from the beginning by abolitionists in the U.S. con-
text.19 The term is also a few years older than “plantocracy.”20 It
was used by Hermann von Holst in his magisterial 1879 Constitu-
tional and Political History of the United States, and has been used
in the law reviews for more than one hundred years.21 Most re-
cently, in 2019, constitutional scholar Paul Gowder described Fred-
erick Douglass as knowing “that the slaveocracy would not follow
the Constitution, at least not until they were forced to do so at
15. See Davis, supra note 10, at 224 n.6.
16. See, e.g., EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2016); SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL
HISTORY (2014).
17. BECKERT, supra note 16; see also Plantocracy, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/def-
inition/plantocracy (last visited July 19, 2020). See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, On
Black South Africans, Black Americans, and Black West Indians: Some Thoughts on WeWant
What’s Ours, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1037, 1057 (2016) (West Indies); Eleanor Marie Lawrence
Brown, How the U.S. Selected for a Black British Bourgeoisie, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 311, 337
(2013) (West Indies); Giselle Reid, The Legacy of Colonialism: A Hindrance to Self-Determi-
nation, 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 277, 284–85 (2000) (Jamaica).
18. 15 Slaveocracy, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter OED XV] (not-
ing pedantically that the word is formed “with erroneous application” because of its struc-
ture).
19. Id. at 670 (“slavocracy”); “Slaveocracy” redirects to “slavocracy.” Id. at 688 (citing to
an 1840 Illinois newspaper that stated hopefully, “The reign of the slaveocracy is hastening
to a close”; an 1842 letter that referred to “Slaveocrats in Georgia”; and an 1848 New York
Express article which was “[a]n exhortation to curb the slaveocracy”).
20. Id. at 670.
21. Lindsay Rogers, Federal Interference with the Freedom of the Press, 23 YALE L.J. 559,
559 n.2 (1914) (citing generally 2 H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (John J. Lalor trans., 1888), where the term appears more
than sixty times); see also Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J.
1290, 1301 (1937) (Roger Taney, John C. Calhoun, and Thomas Benton are described as tak-
ing “the localist-slaveocracy side” of a debate about the role and meaning of the U.S. Consti-
tution).
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gunpoint.”22 Based on its more precise descriptiveness and its com-
parable provenance, “slaveocracy” will be used here, though the sig-
nificance of a plantation economy must also be kept in mind.
B. Coverture and Creditors’ Rights
“Coverture” is the name given to the legal dimensions of the mar-
riage relationship in the common law, especially for the wife, and
more specifically, “the subordinating effects” of marriage on her
“personhood and property.”23 “Coverture held, most basically, that
a husband’s legal identity covered that of the woman he married.”24
This gave the husband tremendously broad powers over the prop-
erty and economic activity of his wife, in life and death: the married
woman could neither enter into contracts nor make a will.25 Any
real property she owned at marriage was placed entirely under his
control and management;26 personal property became his out-
right.27 This institution was shockingly durable: although the
world changed a great deal between the high Middle Ages and the
Victorian era, in England, “[t]he main consequences of coverture at
common law changed little from at least the twelfth century until
the latter decades of the nineteenth century.”28 To the extent that
the American common law of marriage relied on British law—which
it did, well into the nineteenth century—the situation in the U.S.
was similar, although there was some variation between states (es-
pecially community property states), and protection for American
wives’ property rights arrived somewhat sooner.29
More specifically, coverture, in its American form, had some spe-
cific consequences for creditors’ rights. Property a woman owned
premaritally became reachable by her husband’s creditors once they
were married.30 At common law, property inherited by a wife dur-
ing the marriage also “could be seized and sold on execution by the
creditors of the husband.”31 On occasion, an equity court would
22. Paul Gowder, Reconstituting We the People: Frederick Douglass and Jürgen Haber-
mas in Conversation, 114 NW. U. L. Rev. 335, 400 (2019).
23. MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW: COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW
WORLD 6 (Tim Stretton & Krista J. Kesselring eds., 2013).
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7.
29. LYNN DENNIS WARDLE ET AL., FAMILY AND SUCCESSION LAW IN THE USA (4th ed.
2018).
30. E.C. Parks, & Co. v. Cushman, 9 Vt. 320, 325 (Vt. 1837).
31. Starr v. Hamilton, 22 F. Cas. 1107, 1109 (D. Or. 1867) (No. 13,314) (citations omit-
ted); see also Brown v. His Creditors, 17 La. Ann. 113 (La. 1865).
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deviate from the strictest application of these principles, and make
some provision for a wife and her children from an inheritance, as
against the husband’s creditors. For example, a Kentucky court did
so in 1827, in Elliott v. Waring.32 But these were exceptions that
proved the rule.
C. Gifts and Trusts of Enslaved People
Because of the way a plantation economy operates, the land is
made valuable only when coupled with bound labor; crops like
sugar, rice, and cotton could not profitably be grown without it.33
As historian Jennifer Morgan explained, “ownership of land meant
nothing without workers to cultivate it.”34 This fact, coupled with
coverture, presented a planning challenge for the antebellum pater-
familias, who wished to provide appropriately both for sons, who
could manage an estate, and for daughters, who, after marriage,
could not—and might be subjected to the vagaries of a financially
irresponsible or unlucky spouse.
For those with enough property to carry it out, the solution was
to divide the property between the son(s), who received land and
enslaved persons to work it, outright; and the daughter(s), who re-
ceived enslaved people, whether outright or in trust, ideally includ-
ing fertile enslaved women of childbearing age.35 These enslaved
people should not be thought of simply as unpaid domestic labor for
her and her household: maids, cooks, or future wet nurses or nan-
nies. They and their progeny, prospective and actual, were valued
like livestock: to be sold if needed, rented out for profit, and capable
of reproducing and creating greater wealth.36 Even for those with
less property, gifts of fertile enslaved women were especially signif-
icant. As Morgan puts it, “[o]nly through a black woman’s body
could a struggling slaveowner construct munificent bequests to
family and friends.”37 Both lifetime and testamentary gifts followed
this pattern—daughters endowed on birthdays, holidays, and,
32. 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 338, 341 (Ky. 1827).
33. See WOODWARD, supra note 14, cited in Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 1374; see also
MORGAN, supra note 9, at 168.
34. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 71.
35. Id. (“Land was customarily divided between sons, with the eldest receiving the land
on which the family home stood. If the estate was large enough, both sons and daughters
would receive slaves.”); id. at 97–98 (describing the estate plans of Robert Gretton, Miles
Braithwaite, and Phillip Lovell); id. at 101 (describing the estate plan of Arthur Hall); id. at
102 (describing the estate plan of James Goodbe).
36. Diane J. Klein, Emancipation Un-Locke’d: Partus Sequitur Ventrem, Self-Owner-
ship, and “No Middle State” in Maria v. Surbaugh, 20 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER
&CLASS 73, 80–82 (2020).
37. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 92.
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especially, at marriage, with human property, often in trust for
their benefit.
An example of such a plan was the one used by Richard Harris of
“Carolina,”38 who died in 1711 (a year before the colony was divided
into North Carolina and South Carolina).39 His moderately-sized
estate included land, eight enslaved people, and some thirty head
of cattle.40 His eldest son received the land, the house, and two en-
slaved people (“Pompey, Catharina, and ‘her increase’”).41 His
daughter, Anne, received “one slave boy named Jack and a slave
girle [sic] named Flora and her increase and ten cows and calves
and their increase.”42 His other daughters received similar be-
quests.43 Here, in Colonial America, the propertied testator has
made a conventional plan. The primogenitary impulse is expressed
by leaving the land (including the plantation house) to a son, gen-
erally the eldest son, together with an enslaved workforce necessary
to make it valuable; and by endowing a daughter or daughters with
enslaved people, especially enslaved women of childbearing age and
potential, persons whose slavery was, quite literally, her freedom.
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Validates Premarital Trusts of En-
slaved People
Richard Harris’s 1711 plan, and others like it, gave enslaved peo-
ple to daughters outright.44 Should Anne Harris marry, her hus-
band would control that property, and his creditors might seize it.
As time went by, planning became more sophisticated. As historian
Walter Edgar described the situation in South Carolina, “[t]he fam-
ilies of wealthy women sometimes resorted to marriage settlements
to protect the property and interests of their womenfolk from un-
scrupulous spouses.”45 Under one type of settlement, “a bride and
her male relatives established a trust that was administered in her
interests by male kinfolk” (as trustees).46 “So numerous did these
marriage settlements become that the secretary of the province had
to create a separate record group for them.”47
38. Id. at 91.
39. Robert J. Cain, Carolinas, Separation of, ENCYC. OF N.C. (William S. Powell ed.,
2006), https://www.ncpedia.org/carolinas-separation.





45. WALTER EDGAR, SOUTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY 168 (1998).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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In 1809, in Pierce v. Turner, the U.S. Supreme Court validated
such a trust of enslaved people for the benefit of a married woman
against the claims of her husband’s creditors, notwithstanding a de-
fect in recordation.48
Before her marriage, Rebecca Kenner of Virginia owned both land
and enslaved people.49 On February 14, 1798, she and her fiancé
Charles Turner entered into an early version of a “prenup”: she con-
veyed her property into a trust, for the benefit of the two of them
for their joint lives, then to the survivor for life, and then to her (not
his or their) heirs.50 As a result, Charles would never have more
than a life estate in the property. Both of them executed the con-
veyance.51 They married within the next few weeks.52 However,
the deed was never fully executed and recorded during his lifetime,
as Virginia law required.53 They lived in Alexandria until “the au-
tumn of 1801, when they removed into the county of Northumber-
land,” where the land was located.54 He died in December of 1802,55
and was declared intestate in February 1803.56 In the autumn of
that year the widowed Rebecca returned to Alexandria, bringing
enslaved people with her.57 The entirety of Turner’s estate, worth
$4,631.72, was distributed to his creditors—but some debt re-
mained.58 As the court expressed it, “Turner died insolvent, unless
the said slaves are charged with his debts.”59 Are they to be so
charged? The U.S. Supreme Court said no, even while acknowledg-
ing, “[t]hat creditors of the husband, or purchasers from him, may
be injured by the construction . . . but it is not for this tribunal to
afford them relief.”60
Naturally, in the years following Pierce, such marriage settle-
ments became even more common.61 The effect was at least a
48. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 154, 164 (1809).
49. Id. at 165.
50. Id. at 164–65.
51. Id. at 154.








60. Id. at 167.
61. See, e.g., Ward v. Amory, 29 F. Cas. 162 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853) (No. 17,146) (instructing
trustees to create a trust for daughters during coverture); Mitchell v. Moore, 57 Va. (16
Gratt.) 275, 275 (Va. 1861) (creating a trust of engaged woman’s property with her brother
as trustee); Land v. Jeffries, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 211, 211 (1827) (validating a trust created just
a few minutes before the marriage).
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limited avoidance of coverture for women like Rebecca—but not, of
course, any benefit to the enslaved persons.
III. MISSISSIPPI AND AMERICA’S FIRSTMARRIEDWOMEN’S
PROPERTY ACT
The ongoing attempt to protect the property, and especially the
enslaved human property, of free married women leads directly to
the case that gave rise to the first Married Women’s Property Act
in the U.S. Notably, the married woman in question, despite being
descended from three British grandparents, was an indigenous
Chickasaw woman in the eyes of both the tribe and Mississippi law,
and Chickasaw marriage law turns out to be central to the case.
A. Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611 (Miss. 1837)
James Allen, the debtor in Fisher v. Allen, was married to a
woman named Elizabeth (“Betsy”) Love.62 Although she is not a
party, the case cannot be properly understood without knowing who
she is. Although of predominantly European descent, Elizabeth
Love’s family tree had deep roots in the Chickasaw nation. Her
mother, Sally Colbert, was the child of James Logan Colbert, a Scot-
tish trader who first settled in Alabama in 1729.63 Logan, thrice
married, fathered eight children, of whom Sally was one.64 Eliza-
beth’s father, Thomas Love, was “a British Loyalist who fled to the
Chickasaw Nation after Britain’s defeat in the American [Revolu-
tion] . . . .”65 Although Chickasaw-U.S. relations were normalized
in the Treaty of Hopewell in 1786,66 the Chickasaw had allied with
the British during the Revolutionary War.67 When Love married
Sally, he joined this leading mixed-heritage Chickasaw family.68
Thomas and Sally had ten children, one of whom was Elizabeth
Love, born around 1790.69 Thus, although Elizabeth had just one
Chickasaw grandparent (Sally’s mother), she and her siblings, like
62. Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611 (Miss. 1837). See also Robert Gilmer, Chick-
asaws, Tribal Laws, and the Mississippi Married Women’s Property Act of 1839, 68 J. MISS.
HIST. 131, 132–33 (2006).
63. Phillip Knecht, The Chickasaw Cession, HILL COUNTRYHIST., https://hillcountryhis-
tory.org/chickasawcession/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
64. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 138.
65. Id. at 132.
66. Treaty of Hopewell, Choctaw-U.S., Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21.
67. Knecht, supra note 63.
68. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 138.
69. Photograph of the Grave of Elizabeth “Betsy” Love Allen, in FIND A GRAVE (Aug. 6,
2009), https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/40350133/elizabeth-allen. Note that her grave-
stone mistakenly identifies her as the wife of “John” Allen.
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her mother and her maternal aunts and uncles, were all members
of the Chickasaw tribe, which used matrilineal descent for purposes
of tribal membership.70
The Colbert and Love families were prominent in the Chickasaw
Nation and in Chickasaw-U.S. relations for decades prior to this
case. At least one historian has argued that the Colberts effectively
took over the Chickasaw Nation, politically and economically, early
in the nineteenth century.71 Although that may overstate matters,
they were surely a leading family, and they were plantation slave-
holders.72 They remained important for decades: George Colbert
and Benjamin Love were part of the Chickasaw delegation that
signed the 1834 supplemental treaty to the Treaty of Pontotoc
Creek, which resulted in the “near total removal of Chickasaw In-
dians west of the Mississippi River and the loss of the Chickasaw
homelands.”73
Betsy Love and James Allen lived on Chickasaw Nation land that
was included in Monroe County, Mississippi,74 and they were mar-
ried there.75 Betsy Love was a wealthy woman. In 1829, she gave
away twenty-five enslaved people to her ten children.76 Only a
handful of Chickasaw tribal members received more than she did
when their land was sold in 1836 as part of the removal process,
and when she died the next year, her estate included twelve en-
slaved people.77 In the 1829 distribution, Betsy’s younger daughter
Susan received an enslaved boy, Toney.78
The suit that would become Fisher v. Allen has its origins in a
dubious land deal made by Allen. Long before the case was filed,
Allen agreed to sell a tract of land on the Duck River in the Appa-
lachian Mountains (Tennessee) to Alexander Malcolm.79 The price
was five thousand pounds of North Carolina currency—there was
not yet a national currency.80 Malcolm paid, but Allen never deeded
the land to him.81 Allen vigorously opposed government efforts in
the 1820s to reach a land deal with the Chickasaw in Mississippi
70. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 131; Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611, 615 (Miss.
1837).
71. See generally ARRELLM. GIBSON, THE CHICKASAWS (1971).
72. Id. at 99, 150.
73. Knecht, supra note 63.
74. Fisher, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 612.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 615; Gilmer, supra note 62, at 142.
77. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 142.
78. Fisher, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 613–15.
79. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 132.
80. A History of American Currency, AM. NUMISMATIC SOC’Y (2016), http://numismat-
ics.org/a-history-of-american-currency/.
81. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 132.
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because it would potentially make him liable to suit.82 While Allen
resided in Chickasaw territory, however, Malcolm had no remedy
against him—until 1830, whenMississippi law changed.83 Malcolm
promptly sued, and Allen hired attorney John Fisher to represent
him.84 Allen promised to pay Fisher $200—and did not.85 Fisher v.
Allen is a suit for attorney’s fees.86
In Fisher’s suit against Allen, in May 1831, Fisher initially pre-
vailed (Allen did not appear), and was awarded $208.08 (plus
$23.24 in costs).87 Fisher sought to force the sale of Toney to satisfy
the debt.88 The $650 bond posted by Susan’s brother George, and
her great-uncle James Colbert (Sally’s brother), shows that Toney’s
value considerably exceeded what Allen owed Fisher.89 Susan (a
minor, represented by her “next friend,” her older brother, George)
argued, ultimately successfully, that Toney had been her mother
Betsy’s separate property; that Betsy had given Toney to Susan;
and that Toney was therefore unreachable for Allen’s debt to
Fisher.90 Benjamin Love was one of the witnesses who testified,
most likely about Chickasaw law and marital property.91
As some commentators have noted, the Mississippi court rightly
saw this as a choice of law case. While Mississippi law made the
property of a Mississippi wife available to her husband’s creditors,
Chickasaw tribal law and custom did not—it permitted married
women to own and transfer their premarital property and gave no
right in it to their husbands uponmarriage.92 The transfer to Susan
took place in 1829, Mississippi law (including marriage law) was
not “extended over the Indians” until January 1830, and that law is
not retroactive.93 The 1830 law specifically validated marriages
“entered into by virtue of any custom or usage” of the Chickasaw,94
together with applicable marital property laws.95 Susan “wins,”
82. Id. at 140.
83. Id. at 132–33.
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 134.
88. Id.
89. Robert Gilmer, Chickasaws, Tribal Laws, and the Mississippi Married Women’s
Property Act (Nov. 21, 2003) (senior thesis, University of North Carolina at Asheville) (on
file with author).
90. Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611, 614 (Miss. 1837).
91. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 134.
92. Fisher, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) at 615.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 613.
95. Id. at 613–14.
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Fisher loses, Allen never pays his debt—and Toney remains en-
slaved.
Are we then to see tribal law as more enlightened than common
law, simply because it respects the rights of married women as
property owners, with no regard for the “property” in question?96
The Chickasaw law deferred to here, no less than American law at
the time, permitted hereditary chattel slavery of persons of African
descent, the transfer and sale of these persons, and their treatment
as assets.97 Any moral superiority Chickasaw law might enjoy over
Mississippi law with respect to the rights of free wives must surely
be tempered by a clear-eyed assessment of its complicity and de-
fense of slavery. Both served the slaveocracy.
B. Mississippi’s Act for the Protection and Preservation of the
Rights of Married Women
In the aftermath of this case, the Mississippi legislature changed
the law. In a nutshell, as historian Robert Gilmer explains:
Mississippi lawmakers, like Senator T.B.J. Hadley, hurt by the
Panic of 1837, saw an opportunity to protect their own interests
by using part of the Chickasaw tribal law found in the Fisher
v. Allen decision and applying it to all married women in Mis-
sissippi by the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act
of 1839.98
The law that took effect on February 15, 1839, called “An Act for
the Protection and Preservation of the Rights of Married Women,”
consisted of five short sections, four of which explicitly address
property in enslaved people.99 It is worth quoting nearly in its en-
tirety, which makes its emphasis on enslaved human property quite
apparent:
96. See, e.g., 1 J.F.H. CLAIBORNE, MISSISSIPPI, AS A PROVINCE, TERRITORY AND STATE,
WITHBIOGRAPHICALNOTICES OF EMINENTCITIZENS 475 (1880) (“It is singular that an unciv-
ilized tribe of Indians in the interior of Mississippi, in this respect, have anticipated the ac-
tion of more enlightened communities, in a reform of the common law, now acknowledged to
be not only just and proper, but in strict conformity to the highest principles of equity.”);
Gilmer, supra note 62; The Chickasaw Who Changed the Law, in UNCONQUERED AND
UNCONQUERABLE: PART I OF MISSISSIPPI’S INDIANS 64 (Aug. 18, 2016) https://is-
suu.com/meekschool/docs/chickasawnation_1_2016_web/64.
97. Nor is this an isolated incident. See BARBARA KRAUTHAMER, BLACK SLAVES, INDIAN
MASTERS: SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE NATIVE AMERICAN SOUTH
(2013).
98. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 148.
99. A failed proposed amendment also addressed enslaved people specifically, requiring
their registration as an anti-fraud measure. Id. at 136.
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§1. Of what Wife may be Separately Possessed. Any married
woman may become seized or possessed of any property, real
or personal, by direct bequest, demise, gift, purchase, or distri-
bution, in her own name and as of her own property: Provided,
The same does not come from her husband after coverture.
§2. To Hold Slaves Possessed at Marriage. Hereafter when any
woman possessed of a property in slaves, shall marry, her prop-
erty in such slaves and their natural increase shall continue to
her, notwithstanding her coverture: and she shall have, hold,
and possess the same as her separate property, exempt from
any liability for the debts or contracts of the husband.
§3. May take Slaves by Conveyance, Gift, &c. When any
woman, during coverture, shall become entitled to, or pos-
sessed of, slaves by conveyance, gift, inheritance, distribution,
or otherwise, such slaves, together with their natural increase,
shall inure and belong to the wife, in like manner as is above
provided as to slaves which she may possess at the time of the
marriage.
§4.Husband’s Control; Suit by Him and Her; Descent of Slaves.
The control and management of all such slaves, the direction
of their labor, and the receipt of the productions thereof, shall
remain to the husband agreeably to the laws heretofore in
force. All suits to recover the property or possession of such
slaves, shall be prosecuted or defended, as the case may be, in
the joint names of the husband and wife. In case of the death
of the wife, such slaves descend and go to the children of her
and her said husband, jointly begotten; and in case there shall
be no child born of the wife during such her coverture, then
such slaves shall descend and go to the husband and to his
heirs . . . .
§5. Sale of her Property by Joint Deed. The slaves owned by a
femme covert under the provisions of this act, may be sold by
the joint deed of the husband and wife, executed, proved, and
recorded, agreeably to the laws now in force, in regard to the
conveyance of real estate of femme coverts [sic], and not other-
wise . . . .100
100. A. HUTCHINSON, CODE OF MISSISSIPPI: BEING AN ANALYTICAL COMPILATION OF THE
PUBLIC AND GENERAL STATUTES OF THE TERRITORY AND STATE, WITH TABULAR REFERENCES
TO THE LOCAL AND PRIVATE ACTS, FROM 1798 TO 1848 (1848). An Act for the Protection and
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The connection between Fisher v. Allen and the subsequent pas-
sage of the Act is widely noted.101 Neither the case nor the Act can
be understood in isolation from the history of Mississippi in the
1830s, and specifically, of the State’s relationship with the Chicka-
saw Nation.102 The Act coincided with the removal of indigenous
people from Chickasaw land and facilitated it. “Chickasaw matri-
lineal customs dictated that women were the primary landholders
within the Chickasaw Nation, and because of this tradition, Missis-
sippians needed them to be able to consent to sell their lands on
their own, without first receiving permission from a male relative
or tribal leader.”103
The Act was introduced by Senator Thomas B.J. Hadley,104 and
some scholars have focused on the activities of Piety Smith Hadley,
his wife, in insuring its passage.105 But Mrs. Hadley was not just a
legislator’s wife who ran a boardinghouse in Jackson, Missis-
sippi.106 She was also the beneficiary of a testamentary trust in-
cluding enslaved people, and no doubt eager to protect her property
in light of her husband Thomas’s financial difficulties.107 Those who
opposed the Act were acutely aware of the risks to creditors and the
opportunity for fraud.108 But they did not prevail.
Like many legal reforms, it was overdetermined. But whether
Mississippi’s “Act for the Protection and Preservation of the Rights
of Married Women” is credited primarily to the influence of the ac-
quisitive, ambitious mixed-indigenous Love-Colbert family, or to
the connivance of Piety Hadley and her husband, what cannot be
denied is that the primary beneficiaries of the law were free mar-
ried women whose property consisted largely of enslaved Black
women and the enslaved people born to them. We cannot and
should not accept any version of legal history that omits to mention
Preservation of the Rights and Property of Married Women, ch. 46, 1838–1839 Miss. Laws
72 (current version at MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1).
101. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization,
Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 60–61 (1981).
102. Max Grivno, Antebellum Mississippi, MISS. HIST. NOW (July 2015),
http://www.mshistorynow.mdah.ms.gov/articles/395/antebellum-mississippi.
103. Gilmer, supra note 89.
104. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 136.
105. Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Husband and Wife: Memorandum on the Mississippi
Women’s Law of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REV. 1110, 1113 (1944); Sandra Moncrief, The Mississippi
Married Women’s Property Act of 1839, HANCOCK CNTY. HIST. SOC’Y., http://www.han-
cockcountyhistoricalsociety.com/vignettes/the-mississippi-married-womens-property-act-of-
1839/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
106. Brown, supra note 105, at 1113; Moncrief, supra note 105.
107. Brown, supra note 105, at 1113; Moncrief, supra note 105.
108. Gilmer, supra note 62, at 146.
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this,109 and instead celebrates the case or the Act that followed as
an uncomplicated victory for “women’s” rights.
IV. LESSONS STILLUNLEARNED: MEMORIALIZING SUFFRAGE
Unlike the story of Fisher v. Allen and the Mississippi Act, the
story of racism in the women’s suffrage movement has frequently
and compellingly been told.110 The history of the women’s suffrage
movement included explicit racism on the part of leaders of the
movement and in the appeals made for it.111 The Nineteenth
Amendment was passed at the very same time as the “Red Sum-
mer” of race massacres in the U.S.,112 and that is no coincidence:
both can be seen as assertions of white supremacy. Black women,
though not explicitly excluded from the coverage of the Nineteenth
Amendment, were subjected to the same violent voter suppression
as Black men. This is widely known. And yet, when the time came
to memorialize women’s suffrage for its centennial year, the very
same mistakes of exclusion and subordination recurred.
In all of New York City, just five of 150 statues are of real
women.113 None of the twenty-three statues of historical figures in
Central Park, the third most visited tourist attraction in the
world,114 honors a real woman.115 An all-volunteer group calling
109. See, e.g., Bernie Jones, Revisiting the Married Women’s Property Acts: Recapturing
Protection in the Face of Equality, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y&L. 91 (2013) (describing
the history of the Married Women’s Property Act without mentioning Mississippi, slavery, or
Fisher v. Allen).
110. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 70 86 (1981); FAYE E. DUDDEN,
FIGHTING CHANCE: THE STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND BLACK SUFFRAGE IN
RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA 3 (2011); ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE
EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848 1869, at 95 96,
100, 110 (1978); THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER:
CORRESPONDENCE, WRITING, SPEECHES 120 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed., 1981). See generally
LAURA E. FREE, SUFFRAGE RECONSTRUCTED: GENDER, RACE, AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA (2020); LORI D. GINZBERG, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: AN AMERICAN LIFE
(2009); ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
VOTE, 1850 1920 (1998).
111. See sources cited supra note 111.
112. Richard Wormser, Red Summer: 1919, PBS, https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/jimcrow
/stories_events_red.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
113. Sofia Quaglia, The U.S. Has Fewer Than 400 Statues of Women—But That’s Chang-
ing, QUARTZ (Oct. 23, 2019), https://qz.com/1732974/new-york-citys-central-park-will-get-its-
first-statue-of-women/.
114. Central Park Is Third Most Visited Tourist Attraction in the World,
CENTRALPARK.COM, https://www.centralpark.com/news/central-park-third-visited-tourist-at
traction-world/#:~:text=Central%20Park%20came%20in%20third,receives%2039.2%20mil-
lion%20visitors%20annually (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
115. Jeanne Gutierrez & Nicole Mahoney, “Breaking the Bronze Ceiling”: The Elizabeth
Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony Woman Suffrage Movement Monument, N.Y. HIST.
SOC’Y MUSEUM & LIBR.: WOMEN CTR. (July 24, 2018),
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itself “Monumental Women” was founded in 2014, with the goal of
erecting a monument to women’s suffrage in Central Park in time
for the 2020 centennial of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment.116 After years of fundraising and a design contest, their me-
morial to founding suffragettes Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B.
Anthony, and Sojourner Truth, paid for by donations from, among
others, the Girl Scouts of Greater New York,117 was unveiled on Au-
gust 26, 2020.118
But what has already been completely scrubbed from Monumen-
tal Women’s website is that their initial proposal included Stanton
and Anthony, alone—Stanton, who said about Black male suffrage,
“it becomes a serious question whether we had better stand aside
and [let] ‘Sambo’ walk into the kingdom first,”119 and Anthony, who
once said of the Fifteenth Amendment, “[I will] cut off [this] right
arm [of mine] before [I will] ever work for or demand the ballot for
the Negro and not the woman.”120 The group’s legal name is the
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony Statue Fund, Inc.121
Nor does the site’s page mention that the original commission was
for a monument to those two women only (it was not the winning
sculptor Meredith Bergmann’s choice).122 Once unveiled, the origi-
nal design encountered resistance, from Gloria Steinem and oth-
ers,123 resulting in its redesign and the inclusion of Sojourner
Truth.124 “Ain’t I a Woman?,” indeed.125
http://womenatthecenter.nyhistory.org/breaking-the-bronze-ceiling/; see also MONUMENTAL
WOMEN, Monumentalwomen.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2020).
116. MONUMENTALWOMEN, supra note 115.
117. Finalists for Central Park Women’s Suffrage Monument Unveiled, GIRL SCOUTS OF
GREATER N.Y. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.girlscoutsnyc.org/en/our-council/about-gsgny
/news/2018/finalists_for_centra.html.
118. Karen Matthews & Ted Shaffrey, Central Park Monument Honors Women’s Rights
Pioneers, AP NEWS (Aug. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ab166fb617d1d73e0930f0
e6f2a9af78.
119. DAVIS, supra note 110, at 70.
120. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA:
1638 TO PRESENT 143 (1986).
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122. Gutierrez & Mahoney, supra note 115.
123. Ginia Bellafante, Is a Planned Monument to Women’s Rights Racist?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/nyregion/is-a-planned-monument-to-
womens-rights-racist.html.
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Sojourner Truth Unveiled in Central Park, HYPERALLERGIC (Aug. 27, 2020), https://hyperal-
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Whatever the benefits and limitations of bronze statues in Cen-
tral Park as a way to memorialize women’s history,126 one cannot
help but wonder how, in the current decade, in New York City, a
monument to women’s suffrage was designed and approved with no
thought about whether it uncritically memorialized and thus per-
petuated a white supremacist narrative about the struggle to win
the franchise for women. This is white supremacy as an intellectual
disease, slaveocracy as epistemology, shaping what we know, allow
ourselves to know, and hold ourselves responsible for knowing or
failing to know. It clearly continues to ail us.
From where we are now, we cannot change some of the shameful
aspects of early legal feminism in America, which must be under-
stood predominantly as an attempt to elevate and improve the po-
sition of free white women, married or single, to that enjoyed by
their free white brothers, fathers, husbands, and sons. These ef-
forts were not just radically insufficient and under-inclusive. They
actively perpetuated the subordination of enslaved and formerly en-
slaved Black women. Whether from blindness, malice, or greed,
whichever aspects of slaveocracy and white supremacy were acti-
vated, they cannot be expunged from our past. What we can and
must do, however, is tell the fuller truth about that past now.
126. Diane Klein,When Flesh and Blood Meet Bronze and Marble, MEDIUM (July 6, 2020),
https://medium.com/@dianeklein/when-flesh-and-blood-meet-bronze-and-marble-47f05cee12
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